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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - MUNICIPAL CHARTERS - CONSTITU-
TIONAL LA.-P's petitioned the court to obtain a writ of prohibi-
tion to enjoin the Commissioners of the County Court of Kanawha
County, and others, from further acts toward the incorporation of
the proposed City of Belle. Held, writ denied. Prohibition does
not lie to control the actions of a county court which is acting in an
administrative capacity; and further, "Chapter 83, Acts of the
Legislature, 1949, Regular Session, in so far as it relates or may be
applied to municipalities in excess of two thousand population,
violates Article VI, Section 89 (a), of the Constitution of West Vir-
ginia, and, to that extent, is unconstitutional, null and void."
Judge Given dissented as to the constitutional issue. Wiseman v.
Calvert, 59 S.E.2d 455 (W. Va. 1950).
Since the holding in the principal case that prohibition did not
lie disposed of the case, the further discussion as to the constitu-
tionality of certain portions of chapter 83, supra, probably has the
status of a dictum. However, under the circumstances it is believed
this dictum has the practical effect of a holding and will be treated
as such for the purposes of this case comment.
The Municipal Home Rule Amendment was ratified by the
voters in 1935. W. VA. CONST. Art. VI, § 39 (a). To give effect to
the amendment, the legislature in 1937 set up the procedure for the
adoption of home rule charters by existing cities. W. VA. CODE
c. 8-A, art. 2 (Michie, 1949). The Home Rule Amendment reads
as follows: "The legislature shall provide by general laws for the
incorporation and government of cities, towns and villages ...
Under such general laws, the electors of each municipal corporation,
wherein the population exceeds two thousand, shall have power and
authority to frame, adopt, and amend the charter of such corpora-
tion, or to amend an existing charter thereof. . . . Provided that
any such charter or amendment thereto . . . shall be invalid and
void if inconsistent or in conflict with this Constitution or the
general laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter, from time to
time enacted."
In In re Proposal to Incorporate Town of Chesapeake, 180
W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 112 (1947), the court noted that there was
no provision by statute for the original incorporation of cities with a
population exceeding two thousand. To correct this defect the legis-
lature in 1949 made changes in Chapter 8 of the Code to provide for
the incorporation of all cities and towns whether above or below
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two thousand population. In the principal case the majority of the
court declared the attempt unconstitutional: "Such certificate
[meaning the certificate of incorporation, W. VA. CODE C. 8, art. 2
§ 11 (Michie, 1949)] does not confer upon a municipality so incor-
porated any other powers, general or special, or any of the numerous
particular powers provided for a municipality operating under a
home rule charter by virtue of Chapter 56, Acts of the Legislature,
1937, Regular Session. . . . In short to apply the statute to the
original incorporation of the proposed municipality of Belle, the
population of which is in excess of two thousand, would deprive
the electors within its area of their express constitutional right,
under the Home Rule Amendment, to frame and adopt its charter."
At 456. It seems that the court has interpreted the Home Rule
Amendment to require that the electors of each proposed corpora-
tion must have and must in some way exercise their power to frame
and adopt a home rule charter as a condition precedent to incor-
poration. If the court had taken due regard to several liberal rules
of constitutional and statutory construction followed by the West
Virginia court in the past the result might have been different.
"While legislative exposition of a constitutional provision is
not conclusive, it is entitled to great weight .... It should not be
rejected unless manifestly erroneous." State v. County Court of
Kanawha County, 112 W. Va. 98, 107, 163 S.E. 815, 819 (1932).
Every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save
a statute from unconstitutionality. State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233,
120 S.E. 514 (1923). Any doubt as to the constitutionality of an
act of the legislature will always be resolved in favor of the validity
of the statute. State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 48 S.E.2d 214
(1947).
Utilizing the above rules of construction, can it not be said
that in Chapter 8 of the Code the legislature has provided by
general laws for the incorporation and government of cities and
towns? The certificate of incorporation therein provided brings
the corporation into' existence with the right "to exercise all the
corporate powers conferred by the said Chapter from and after the
date of this certificate." W. VA. CODE c. 8, art. 2, § 11 (Michie,
1949). The electors of any city thus brought into existence wherein
the population exceeds two thousand has the power and authority
to frame, adopt or amend a home rule charter. W. VA. CODE c. 8-A,
art. 2, § 1 (Michie, 1949). Of course, until the city exercises its
power, it cannot depend on any powers granted by such statute.
State v. Wheeling, 128 W. Va. 47, 35 S.E.2d 681 (1945).
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All the Home Rule Amendment requires by its terms is that
the electors of each municipal corporation shall have the power to
frame, adopt, and amend a charter. There can be no corporation
until one is brought into existence by law. Reductio ad absurdum,
can there be electors of a municipal corporation unless a corpora-
tion is first brought into existence? The Home Rule Amendment
seems to require only that the electors of existing corporations shall
be given the power to frame, adopt and amend a home rule charter.
Without doubt the Home Rule Amendment is ambiguously
worded. Just how much home rule authority does a municipal
corporation in reality have if its charter is "invalid and void if
inconsistent or in conflict with this constitution or the general laws
of the state then in effect, or thereafter, from time to time enacted"?
Home Rule Amendment, supra. The legislature could, in the final
analysis, provide by general laws for most, if not all, provisions of
municipal charters.
If the court is to construe the Home Rule Amendment so
strictly, the legislature is faced with a difficult task in attempting to
find a practical method of complying with its provisions. Surely
the court does not mean to infer that it is necessary that all com-
munities adopt home rule charters as a condition precedent to
incorporation. Perhaps just an agreement by the voters, as a part
of the election for incorporation, to begin their corporate exist-
ence under the general provisions of Chapter 8 of the Code would
be sufficient. However, if the sometimes hard-fought issue for or
against incorporation must be combined with the issues always
present in the adoption of a home rule charter, it is improbable
that many industrial communities over two thousand population
will be able to incorporate.
Until such time as the legislature or the court has clarified the
procedure for the incorporation of cities having a population of
more than two thousand, it seems that communities such as Belle
should first attempt to incorporate some compact area containing
a population of less than two thousand. As soon as such area is
incorporated, the balance of the community could be annexed.
See W. VA. CODE c. 8, art. 2, §§ 13, 114 (Michie, 1949).
The effect of the decision, when read in conjuncture with the
Chesapeake case, supra, can be summarized as follows: (1) the
charter of any city incorporated in West Virginia since 1935 is null
and void, if the community had a population in excess of two
thousand at the time of incorporation [but see Albuquerque v.
Water Supply Co., 24 N.M. 368, 174 Pac. 217 (1918) as to the possi-
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bility that such city would have the status of a de facto corporation],
(2) under existing statutes there is no method by which a com-
munity with a population in excess of two thousand can be incor-
porated as a unit, (3) assuming the legislature will be able to draft
statutes acceptable to the court's construction of the Home Rule
Amendment, the complex issues which probably must be decided
by the voters of the proposed municipality will make incorporation
extremely difficult.
J. S. W., Jr.
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX-RFEFUND STATUTE.-P
sued the state tax commissioner to recover an overpayment of busi-
ness and occupation taxes as had been authorized by W. VA. CODE
c. 11, art. 13, § 8 (Michie, 1949). The circuit court sustained the
state's demurrer to the notice of motion for judgment, and on its
own motion certified the ruling to the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Held, that the legislature exceeded its constitutional powers and
to the extent that the statute undertakes to authorize such action
or suit, it is invalid as violative of W. VA. CONsT. Art. VI, § 35.
Ruling affirmed. Hamill v. Koontz, 59 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1950).
A case with similar facts which reached the same result was
Raible Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 239 Ala. 41, 194 So. 560 (1940).
It is a well recognized principle of law that a sovereign inde-
pendent state is not subject to suit except by its own consent. Cohen
v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821). The consent of the state could
not be given by the West Virginia statute because it was beyond the
power of the legislature to authorize such suits in view of the con-
stitutional provision which reads: "The state of West Virginia shall
never be made defendant in any court of law or equity, except ...
[certain officers thereof] may be made defendant in any garnish-
ment or attachment proceeding .... " W. VA. CONST. Art. VI, § 35.
The constitutional immunity from suit has been held to cover
boards and commissions, created by the legislature, as agencies of
the state. Mahone v. State Road Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E.
820 (1925); Watts v. State Road Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 398, 185 S.E.
520 (1936). An agent of the state is protected from suit by the con-
stitutional prohibition of actions against the state, though the state
is not in name a party, where the interests of the state are directly
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